Digital audio recording is the main evidence used in the field of judicial forensics. Recently, a number of digital audio forensic techniques have been developed and the audio source identification (ASI) is one of the most active research topics. Most of existing ASI works mainly focus on improving the performance of detection accuracy and robustness. Little consideration has been given to ASI anti-forensics, which aims at attacking the forensic techniques. To expose the weaknesses of these source identification methods, we propose an anti-forensic framework based on generative adversarial network (GAN) to falsify the source information of an audio by adding specific disturbance. The experimental results show that the falsified audio can deceive the forensic methods effectively, and can even control their conclusions. Three state-of-art ASI methods have been evaluated as the attacking targets. For the confusing attack, the proposed method can significantly reduce their detection accuracies from about 97% to less than 5%. For the misleading attack, a misleading rate about 81.32% has been achieved while ensuring the perceptual quality of the anti-forensic audio.
I. INTRODUCTION
Audio source identification (ASI) is an important part of digital audio forensics, which focus on identifying the source of the target audio from a candidate list of recording devices. As each recording device has unique electronic components and structures, it will leave specific intrinsic trace in the recorded audio. Hence, it becomes possible to identify the audio's source by analyzing the traces left by the recording devices.
In general, the traditional ASI method consists of two steps, feature extraction and classification. Kraetzer et al. [1] first explored the source identification of microphones recorded speech. They employed a steganalytic feature set derived from both the time domain and the Mel-frequency domain, using the K-means for clustering and Naïve Bayes for classification. They achieved a classification accuracy of 70%. In [2] , Hanilci et al. employed the MFCCs extracted from audio signals, and then fed it into a support vector The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Nour Moustafa . machine (SVM) classifier. A best accuracy of 96.42% was obtained on their close set. In [3] , an SVM classifier was used to compare the performance of various acoustic features, including Mel-frequency, linear frequency, bark frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs, LFCCs and BFCCs, respectively) as well as the linear prediction cepstral coefficients (LPCCs). Their study showed that MFCCs achieved the best performance for source identification. Kotropoulos and Samaras [4] extracted MFCCs from individual frames of audio signals and trained a Gaussian mixture model (GMM) with diagonal covariance matrices. Thus, the template for each device was built up from Gaussian supervectors (GSVs) and an identification accuracy of 97.6% was obtained by using neural networks with radial basis function (RBF) kernels on a dataset of 21 cell-phones. Zou et al. [5] also utilized GMM as the classifier, and showed that MFCCs are more effective than the power-normalized cepstral coefficients for representing the source information of device. In fact, the combination of MFCCs and SVM always can achieved excellent performance in source identification. Furthermore, Luo et al. [6] proposed a band energy difference (BED) feature, which can effectivelly characterize the recording device. They reached an accuracy of over 96% by using the standard SVM classifier on a dataset of 31 cell-phones.
However, most of the existing source identification techniques focus on the improvement of the detection accuracy by selecting a better feature and effective classifier. A malicious forger may launch an anti-forensic attack against existing forensic detectors. On the opposite of forensics, it has been reported that a malicious forger would perform some antiforensic operations to confuse or mislead the existing forensic methods in the field of image forensics. For example, Fontani and Barni [7] pioneered anti-forensics of median filtering (MF), which made MF images less detected by the forensic techniques [8] - [10] while maintaining the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR). Stamm and Liu [11] attempted to conceal the traces left by JPEG compression to deceive the detection of double JPEG compression. Milani et al. [12] presented a method for fooling the JPEG double compression detector based on Benford's law.
Recently, data-driven methods, particularly the deep learning, have evolved into the state-of-the-art approach and obtained remarkable performance for forensic tasks. Without the need of designing hand-crafted features, deep convolutional neural networks (CNN) shows a promising way in automatic feature extraction that model a problem space directly from the data itself. Meanwhile, deep learning techniques have also been utilized in the field of anti-forensics, and present a great challenge to forensics. For example, Luo et al. [13] proposed a JPEG compression anti-forensic method using generative adversarial networks. Their generator can automatically learn how to erase the complex artifacts left by JPEG compression during the optimization process against the discriminator, and their anti-forensic images can deceive the JPEG compression detectors [14] and ensure very good visual quality. Chen et al. [15] utilized the legacy traces of a source camera that generated a forged image against a camera identification network. The anti-forensic images obtained by their trained generators can trick the CNN-based camera model recognition classifier.
Generative adversarial network is a deep learning framework first used in the machine learning and computer vision communities to generate data that can statistically mimic the distribution of training data [16] . Since GAN has been successfully applied in the field of anti-forensics [13] , [15] , it is also possible to train a specific generator for obtaining the anti-forensic audio to attack the ASI method.
In this paper, we propose an anti-forensic framework to deceive the traditional ASI methods. Our proposed attack utilizes a GAN to falsify the information of the source device in the audio and ensure its perceptual quality. To construct our anti-forensic attack, we design and train our GAN architecture, and then we use the trained generator to falsify the original specific device audio. The loss functions of the networks are formulated to ensure the perceptual quality of the falsified audio and force the generator to learn the target FIGURE 1. The overall structure of our framework. The input audio x is firstly sent into the Generator to generate a falsified audio x . These x and the original audios (ORG) are further fed into the Discriminator for identification. Then forzen the parameters of discriminator, the loss from discriminator and detector will be feedback to generator which presented by the dotted lines.
device's specific traces by incorporating feedback from the simulated source identification classifier. Three state-of-art ASI methods have been selected as the attack targets. For the confusing attack, the proposed method can reduce their detection accuracies to less than 5%. For the misleading attack, a misleading rate of more than 80% has been achieved.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the detail of our proposed GAN framework. Section 3 presents the experiment setting and extensive experiments against various kinds of source identification detectors, in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. Conclusions and future research directions are given in Section 4.
II. PROPOSED ANTI-FORENSIC FRAMEWORK
In this section, we will give a general description of the proposed anti-forensic attacks for source identification via a Generative Adversarial Networks and then explain how it works. More details of each module will also be given.
The overall goal of our anti-forensic attack is to falsify the forensic traces left by a recording device, so that the attacked audio can spoof the source identification classifier. In order to build a successful attack, the attacked audio should appear to be authentic and contain no perceptual traces of modification.
Our anti-forensic attacks are divided into two strategies: confusing attack and misleading attack. Given a wellperformed forensic detector C, x is an original audio belonging to the device category y, C(x) = y. The confusing attack is to construct another audio x , which is expected to be very similar to x (according to some metric) but C(x ) = y. The misleading attack is a targeted attack which aims to make C(x ) = t, where t is a specified category chosen by the adversary. We report the misleading attack success only if the x be misclassifed to the target category t by detector C.
A. OVERALL ARCHITECTURE
As shown in Figure 1 , the proposed framework consists of three modules: a generator G, a discriminator D and a pretrained forensic detector C. To modify the implicit source information, G is used to generate the falsified audio x by introducing minimal disturbance into the original audio x. The discriminator D is designed to distinguish a real audio sample from ORG (consists of original audios from real world) and a falsified audio sample x . In order to achieve the goal of anti-forensics, we deploy a forensic detector C to encourage the generator to learn how to modify the forensic traces. Once the loss on validation audios reached an acceptable level, we add the pre-trained detector C into our framework, which output a probability p of classifying the falsified audio x . Then, through adversarial training of G, D and C, the generator will adjust the parameters to achieve a better performance in generating the anti-forensic audio.
B. ARCHITECTURE OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 1) GENERATOR
As mentioned above, the generator G is used to generate anti-forensic audios. To achieve this, we use SEGAN [17] as a reference structure to design our generator because it has been successfully employed in speech enhancement. As shown in Figure 2 , the generator takes the original audio x (size=1×16000) as the input, and consists of a downsampling component and a corresponding upsampling component with 14 groups of layers.
The downsampling component consists of 7 convolution groups: each group includes a convolutional layer with 64 filters, 1×30 kernel and stride 2, followed by a batchnormalization (BN) layer and a Leaky-ReLU activation which has been proved to be beneficial to stabilize the training process of GAN [18] . The upsampling component is composed of the same setup of groups: each includes a deconvolutional layer, and followed by a BN layer and ReLU activation. To increase the convergence rate and decrease the information loss when information travels through multiple layers, we place the skip connection that connecting each convolutional layer to its corresponding deconvolutional layer. It has been proved that the skip connection can offer a better training behavior, as the gradients can flow deeper through the whole structure without suffering much vanishing [19] . Finally, the sigmoid activation is added to restrict the output to the range between 0 to 1.
2) DISCRIMINATOR
The discriminator D is designed to distinguish between real and generated audio. Here, we design a relatively complex architecture for D, which is competitive against the generator in the architecture. As shown in Figure 3 , the discriminator follows the same one-dimensional convolutional structure as the downsampling component of generator which consists of 7 convolutional groups. Finally, fully connected layers coupled with a softmax layer are commonly used to generate an output class probability.
3) PRE-TRAINED DETECTOR
The pre-trained detector C can be any ASI classifier. In our framework, we use the identification algorithm proposed by Hanilci et al. [2] because it has achieved stateof-the-art performance for source identification. The details of the algorithm are shown in Figure 4 . The detector first extracted 12-dimensional MFCCs and their first-order derivative coefficients of 36 dimensions frame by frame as the feature vectors. The feature vectors of an audio sample were expanded by polynomial expansion of generalized linear discriminant sequence kernel (GLDS) method and averaged into a single high-dimensional feature vector which is used to represent the characteristics of the audio file. Then we apply the machine-learning tool LibSVM package [20] on the training of the detector C. During the training of our framework, the detector C received a falsified audio and get a predict label. Then a classification loss will be computed to feedback the generator like L c1 and L c2 in confusing attack and misleading attack, respectively, which will encourage the generator to automatically learn how to change the source information of the falsified audios. Due to space limitations, we refer the readers to [2] for a complete setup of the identification alogrithm of the detector C.
C. LOSS FUNCTION
To achieve the anti-forensic purpose, the generator G should be able to automatically learn how to falsify an audio to deceive the classifier successful while introducing a minimal disturbance. Therefore, we define the loss function L_G as
where L_l1 represents the perceptional loss between the original audio x and falsified audio x , L_adv represents the adversarial loss for deceiving the D, L_c1 represents the classification loss of the forensic detector C when in confusing attack, L_c2 represents the classification loss of the detector C when in misleading attack. α, β, θ 1 , θ 2 are the weights for each loss term, while in confusing attack, weight balance is empirically set as α = 1000, β = 1, θ 1 = 1, θ 2 = 0, respectively, and α = 1000, β = 1, θ 1 = 0, θ 2 = 1 in misleading attack.
Since the attack should leave no perceptual artifacts, we simulate the perceptual loss using the mean absolute difference between the original audio and its falsified one. For an original audio x of size 1 × l, the absolute difference between x and its falsified copy x is computed as:
where G(·) denotes the output of the generator, N and the subscript i represents the batch size and the position of x i in this batch. In order to realize an effective confusing attack, we need to optimize the generator using the classification loss L c1 and L c2 , which are designed to measure the distance between the output of C in classifying the falsified audio x' with its original category y. Let C(·, ·) represent the output of the detector, the proposed confusing attack aims to maximize the L c1 as follows:
where y denotes the real category of falsified audio x . For misleading attack, it needs to target a category t. We only report success when C(x ) = t. Hence, the misleading attack aims to minimize the loss L c2 , which represents the distance between predict category and the target category t. L c2 is thus defined as:
Although the perceptual loss and the classification loss force the generator to introduce the anti-forensically disturbance in falsified audios, they may have some limitation in reconstructing complex statistics between real and the generated sample. Therefore, we incorporate the adversarial loss L adv for the generator which to ensure the distribution of generated audios can be closer to the original audios. It is defined as
where D(·) represents the output probabilities of the discriminator.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate our proposed anti-forensic methods by attacking the current state-of-the-art ASI techniques. First, we create two audio databases specially to exploit the traces left by the various audio recording devices. Then, three advanced forensic techniques [2] , [4] , [6] are trained as the benchmark to evaluate our anti-forensic audios. Finally, ACC (Accuracy) and SAR (Successful Attack Rate) are adopted to demonstrate the attack performance and Perceptual evaluation of speech quality (PESQ) [21] is to evaluate the perceptual quality of the falsified audio.
A. DATABASE
To perform the experiments, we use all audio from two databases, TIMIT-RD and LIVE-RECORD. TIMITrecaptured database (TIMIT-RD) has been built based on the utterances chosen from TIMIT database by using 16 different cell-phones given in Table 1 . TIMIT [22] is a typical speech database which consists of 630 speakers from different dialects of American English (192 females and 432 males) and each speaker reads ten sentences which is approximately 3-seconds-long. For TIMIT-RD, the utterances, which randomly selected from the 160 speakers (80 females and 80 males) in TIMIT, were replayed by a high-fidelity loudspeaker in a silent office and recaptured by 16 cell-phones, simultaneously. Then a 60-minutes-long audio file were obtained for each cell-phone. The LIVE-RECORD was established using the same recording environment and cell-phones used in TIMIT-RD. 12 speakers (6 females and 6 males) were invited to participate in the recording to read the delivered content which consists of several commonly-used phrases, sentences and abbreviations written in English, which is generally about 7-minuteslong. So that we obtained an 82-minutes-long audio for each cell phones. Then we segmented those audio file into 1-second-long.
In the experiments, we first mix two databases and then randomly divide them into two datasets, ORG_TRAIN as the train set and ORG_TEST as the test set. Therefore, we obtain 98,240 1-second-long training audios and 40,000 testing audios. Then we train the three sources identification detectors [2] , [4] , [6] using the train set. The obtained average test classification accuracies for the detector [2] , [4] , [6] are 97.32%, 96.60%, 98.24%, respectively, which is consistent with results reported in the original publication [2] , [4] , [6] .
B. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND EVALUATION METRICS 1) EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Given the pre-trained ASI detector, we trained our network on patch sized audios as mentioned in Figure 1 with the pairs of sets: ORG_TRAIN (any original audio from train set), ORG_DX (the audios from specific device DX) during the confusing attack, and ORG_TRAIN , ORG_T _ALL (any original audios from the train set except the device T ) during the misleading attack, DX and T denote the ID of device in Table 1 and the target category t mentioned in section 2. Specifically, we build the confusing attack for each device given in Table 1 . Furthermore, we perform the effect of the proposed misleading attack in 6 different targeted categories (t = D1, D3, D6, D8, D11, D14) which randomly selected from Table 1 . In consideration of the actual, we segment and stitch all 1-second-long anti-forensic audios to obtain other anti-forensic audios including 5000 0.5-seconds-long clips, 1250 2-seconds-long clips and 800 3-seconds-long clips, considering that the audio may be cut into different size by forensic investigator before the detection. Next we take the same operation in original testing audios.
To build all 22 generators with two attack strategies (16 for confusing and 6 for misleading), we employ the Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 1 × 10 −4 for the generator, and 1 × 10 −5 for the discriminator. During the training process, we first train the generator with batch size 64 and weight terms of α = 1000, β = 0, θ 1 = 0, θ 2 = 0 for 10 epochs. Next, we train the generator and the discriminator iteratively for 30 epochs with weight terms of α = 1000, β = 1, θ 1 = 0, θ 2 = 0 and an iteration ratio of 1 : 5, which gives the discriminator more iterations to get a better performance for the training of the generator. Then in the last 20 epochs, the pre-trained detector C was utilized to classify the generated audios x after each iterative training between G and D, then the losses L c1 and L c2 can be calculated and feedbacked to the generator for optimizing the parameters, respectively.
2) EVALUATION METRICS
PESQ is adopted to compare the falsified audios x with the original ones x, which is the latest and most standard audio quality assessment algorithms, which range from −0.5 to 4.5.
Meanwhile, the detection accuracy has been considered as the evaluation metric, which widely used to represent the credibility of the source identification algorithm. The detection accuracy is defined as:
where x i presents the audio generated by G(·) of the i th audio recording and y denote the category of the source device of audio x; δ(·, ·) is a function that is equal to 1 if F(G(x)) = y and 0 otherwise, while F(·) presents the source identification detectors proposed by [2] , [4] , [6] . In addition, we used the successful attack rate (SAR) as the metric to evaluate the antiforensically performance of the misleading attack, defined as:
where t denotes the category of the targeted cell phone, we only report success when F(G(x i )) = t.
C. EXPERIMENTAL PERFORMANCE AND ANALYSIS 1) PERFORMANCE OF CONFUSING ATTACK
We perform our confusing attack by against the three advanced techniques [2] , [4] , [6] on the sets: ORG_TEST , AF_TEST , where AF_TEST is the audio set including the all anti-forensic audios AF_DX generated from ORG_TEST , which falsified by each trained generator from the original test set. Specifically, for each testing 2500 original audios from 16 devices, we create its anti-forensic copies. Thereafter, in order to assess our anti-forensically performance, the three trained detectors were used to identify the source Confusion matrix (%) for identifying the class of anti-forensic audios using the detector [6] . The asterisks '' '' denote that the corresponding values are below 1%. device of AF_TEST . We report the detection accuracy of three detectors on Table 2 , where we can see a significant degradation of the accuracy. We also computed the PESQ between the anti-forensic audios and original audios to measure the distortion introduced by the attack. Then we demonstrate the boxplots of each PESQ of AF_DX in Figure 5 .
The experimental results are in line with expectations, it can be seen from Table 2 , the accuracy of each detector significantly decreases from around 97% in ORG_TEST to about 5% in AF_TEST .
For example, Table 3 shows the multiclassification results by the detector [6] , the AF_DX present the anti-forensic audio which was falsified by the confusing attack. This confusion matrix give us information about the classification errors that the detector makes, we note that some of the mistakes made by the detector can be attributed to the fact that the antiforensic audio is inclined to be misclassified as the device of same brand, such as the AF_D3 was been misclassified as HTC M7 (D4) and the AF_D8 was been misclassified as Meizu MX4 (D9). It is obvious that our confusing attack is effective in deceive the source identification detectors. Figure 5 shows the spectrograms of an original audio (left) which recording by a HTC D820t (D3), together with its antiforensic audio (middle) which was falsified by our confusing attack and classified as HTC M7 (D4), and the introduced disturbance (right). And the PESQ value of most AF_DX are over 3.3 as shown in Figure 6 , which means our anti-forensic audios can contain a well perceptual quality when attack the forensic technique successfully.
2) PERFORMANCE OF MISLEADING ATTACK
In this experiment, we evaluate the performance of the antiforensic audios generated for building the misleading attack. For all 6 targeted generators, we also created the anti-forensic set AF_T _ALL falsified by each targeted generator for each target category T = 1, 3, 6, 8, 11, 14. Then, we report the successful attack rate (SAR) in Table 4 , which accounts for how many falsified audios will be misclassified as its targeted category t, and the AF_T _ALL denote the anti-forensic audio falsified by our misleading attack. The mean SAR for all anti-forensic audio falsified by 6 targeted generators are 81.32%. It shows that our attack can successfully control the conclusion of the forensic method. Similarly, we compute the PESQ of the AF_T _DX (anti-forensic audios from device X , falsified by generator with target equal to T ) and then demonstrate the boxplots of each PESQ of AF_T _DX in Figure 8 (a-f). In general, we observe that the anti-forensic audio produced by our generator maintains well quality compared to the original audios. Figure 8 shows the spectrograms of an original audio (left) recording by a Huawei Honor7, together with its anti-forensic audio (middle) which through the misleading attack with a target category t = 1 and it was been classified as iPhone 6 (D1) by three detectors [2] , [4] , [6] , and the introduced disturbance (right).
It is observed that this example is perceptually close to the original audio, and have the statistical characteristic of the raw image for the anti-forensic purpose, and the undetectable disturbance introduced by our method is tiny even most apparent during high-frequency content.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present an anti-forensic method to against the audio source identification technique, which based on a generative adversarial network. Unlike the conventional anti-forensic methods,ing our method can generate the anti-forensic audio with the goal of better anti-forensic performance in a data-driven manner. Through rigorous experiments, the results demonstrate that our anti-forensic audio with confusing attack can significantly confuse the existing ASI detectors, meanwhile, the misleading attack can successfully control the conclusion of detectors with over 81.32% successful attack rate while maintain a high perceptual quality. RANGDING WANG received the Ph.D. degree from Tongji University, in 2004. He is currently a Professor with Ningbo University, China. His research interests mainly include multimedia security, digital watermarking for digital rights management, data hiding, and steganography. VOLUME 7, 2019 
